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Abstract. Law enforcement agencies are facing an ever-increasing flood of data 
to be acquired, stored, assessed and used. Automation and advanced data analy-
sis capabilities are required to supersede traditional manual work processes and 
legacy information silos by automatically acquiring information from a range of 
sources, analyzing it in the context of on-going investigations, and linking it to 
other pieces of knowledge pertaining to the investigation. This paper outlines a 
modular architecture for management of linked data in the law enforcement 
domain and discusses legal and policy issues related to workflows and infor-
mation sharing in this context. 
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1 Introduction 
Investigations conducted by law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are increasingly reliant 
on effective collection and analysis of information that may be obtained from a varie-
ty of sources, internal and external to the organization [1]. Investigations generally 
follow an iterative process of information collection, assessment, investigation plan-
ning, execution, and brief of evidence preparation where each step either produces 
new information or relies on information collected earlier in the process. 
Information collected within the organization include information about individu-
als, organizations, objects and entities of interest, witness statements, evidence ob-
tained from crime scenes, communications intercepts and the results of forensic anal-
ysis. This information may be complemented and integrated with data such as finan-
cial transactions, travel and immigration records, and criminal history that are ob-
tained from external sources. In addition, documentation about the investigation pro-
cess and data provenance must be maintained in order to establish that evidence sub-
mitted to court had been obtained within the law and policies relevant to the investi-
gation.  
Accessing data as well as linking and integrating them in a correct and consistent 
way is a pressing challenge in particular when underlying data structures and access 
methods change over time. Lack of interoperability between information systems 
 within and across organizations remains one of the prevalent concerns of investigators 
[2]. Investigations are delayed by poor information management practices that result 
in information being unavailable or not being available in a timely manner, poor in-
formation quality, and cumbersome manual approval and information retrieval proce-
dures. 
The project Integrated Law Enforcement (ILE), conducted by the Data to Deci-
sions Cooperative Research Centre (D2D CRC)
1
, aims to develop a platform where 
investigators can manage the information collection, analysis, and processes pertain-
ing to a case through a consistent single user-facing platform. The project has been 
developing technological solutions for information management, linking, and analysis 
that are tailored to the needs of investigators. An extensible software architecture for 
searching, linking, and integration of data sources forms one of the corner stones of 
the project. The platform will eventually include analytic services that can be invoked 
by investigators. The data management architecture is complemented with a state of 
the art user-facing portal and an analysis of legal aspects pertaining to workflows and 
information sharing.  
Effective linking, integration, and analysis of data requires breaking down data “si-
los” and opening up legacy systems within organizations to make information acces-
sible, establishing procedures and technical infrastructure to effectively and timely 
share information across organizational boundaries, creating data standards to facili-
tate interpretation and analysis of the body of collected data, and automating, where 
possible, analysis and semantic enrichment of data [3]. 
Data integration in this context raises serious legal compliance and good govern-
ance challenges. Compliance with existing laws and principles is a pre-condition of 
the whole process [4]. Transparency and privacy should be preserved to foster trust 
between citizens and national security and law enforcement agencies. A 2015 litera-
ture review on online data mining technology intended for law enforcement  broadly 
singled out eight main problems (crimes, investigative requirements) in 2015 [1]. 
Separately, some criminologists warned against the profound effect of automated data 
collection on the traditional criminal justice system, as it could undercut the due pro-
cess safeguards built into the traditional criminal justice model [5]. It is our conten-
tion that this technological modelling should be performed under the protections of 
the rule of law. 
In this paper, we present the overall system architecture for information sharing 
and outline the related legal issues pertaining to workflows and information exchange 
in the context of policing investigations. Our work has resulted in a data access 
framework for law enforcement which provides a comprehensive data and meta-data 
model including provenance, security, confidence, links and timeline information 
related to entities and links. This meta-data layer spans a Knowledge Graph-like view 
[7] of information pertaining to entities relevant to investigations. The resulting data 
and meta-data model serves as the foundation for information use, governance, data 
quality protocols, analytic pipelines and exploration of search results. 
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 2 Information Sharing in Law Enforcement  
Timely information sharing domain is crucial for the success of many investigations 
in the law enforcement domain. Unfortunately, many investigations are stalled by one 
or more of a number of impediments related to effectively sharing information among 
investigators and organizations [2]. In the following we highlight a selection of issues 
relevant in context of linked information access. 
Among the technical impediments, internal information silos and cumbersome in-
formation access procedures are common. Investigators routinely enter the same que-
ries across a multitude of legacy information systems and manually collate and inte-
grate the results. Lack of information access mechanisms for investigators in the field 
hamper the timely acquisition of information in electronic form and information may 
not be updated in timely manner. In absence of automated alerts, investigators may be 
unaware that new information relevant to a case has become available unless they 
manually issue queries periodically or rely on informal personal connections to re-
ceive notifications. As a result, relevant information may be missed even though it 
had been available in an information system. Data quality varies greatly as data quali-
ty standards are often not enforced and instead left to the individual user. 
Workflows and policies may impact upon investigations. Where approvals for ac-
tions are required, for example expenditure approval for call records requests, anti-
quated policies and work processes may still rely on paper forms and manual approval 
which result in excessive delays, in particular if approvals are sought outside of nor-
mal office hours. Here, automation and electronic means of requesting and obtaining 
warrants and approvals would streamline the investigation process. 
Legal issues relate to restrictions on information use and sharing. For example, in-
formation obtained under a warrant for a specific investigation may not generally be 
used in the context of other investigations. Similarly, agencies are generally subject to 
restrictions on what information they can share with other agencies [2]. Even where 
information sharing may be legally permitted, many organizations, concerned about 
the implications of breaching the law, are prone to adopt prudential attitudes and poli-
cies that perhaps may unnecessarily restrict what can be shared. Information security 
and access control are challenging issues when multiple systems and organizations are 
involved. It is challenging to guarantee comprehensive and secure access to a large 
number of users accessing a multitude of information systems across organizational 
boundaries. Moreover, there is interaction between analytics and security attributes as 
new information derived from automated analytic processes must be classified using 
appropriate security policies to avoid inadvertently disclosing otherwise inaccessible 
information. Determining appropriate classification and access restrictions can be 
challenging in organizations.  
3 System Architecture 
An open architecture for data/meta-data management and analytic processes has been 
defined. It translates the best practices from Enterprise Application Integration to the 
 “Big Data” analytic pipelines [6]. Our work addresses aspects related to data and 
meta-data modelling and storage, modelling and execution of analytic processes, and 
efficient execution of analytic processes across multiple analytic tools and data 
sources. Central to this architecture is a method for effective semi-interactive entity 
linking and querying of linked data (akin to automatically generated linked ontologies 
such as YAGO [13]). The project intends to realize a comprehensive data manage-
ment framework that relies on a well-defined share data and meta-data model sup-
ported by vendor-agnostic interfaces for data access and execution of processes com-
prising analytic services offered by different tools. 
The overall architecture of the ILE platform is shown in Figure 1. A federated ar-
chitectural model has been adopted, where one or more instances of the ILE platform 
can be deployed and access a number of external data sources. Each instance may 
provide query and analytic services to the front-end applications and can obtain data 
from other instances and external sources on demand. This approach is necessary as 
data in external sources is usually controlled by external organizations and may 
change at any time. Moreover, organizational policies in this context rarely support 
traditional Extract-Transform-Load ingestion processes across organizational bounda-
ries. 
The ILE platform provides programmatic interfaces (APIs) to front-end applica-
tions to access data and invoke analytic services. The interfaces expose the platform’s 
services using a uniform data format and communication protocol. The APIs can be 
accessed from a desktop front-end where investigators can search and enter infor-
mation as well as invoke services. Mobile applications for investigators may be de-
veloped in future versions of the platform. 
Each instance maintains a Curated Linked Data Store, that is, a set of databases 
that collectively implement a knowledge-graph like structure comprising entities and 
their links and meta-data. This curated data store holds facts and meta-data about 
entities and their links whose veracity has been confirmed. This data store is used to 
infer the results for queries and to synthesize requests to external sources and other 
instances if further information is required. As such, the linked data store implements 
a directory of entities and links enriched with appropriate meta-data and source in-
formation such that detailed information can be obtained from authoritative sources 
that may be external to the system. This approach is needed as data in the law en-
forcement domain is dispersed among a number of systems owned and operated by 
different agencies. As such no centrally controlled database can feasibly be put in 
place in the foreseeable future.  
The information contained in the linked data store is governed by an Ontology that 
defines the entity types, link types, and associated meta-data that is available among 
the collective platform. The ontology acts as a reference for knowledge manage-
ment/organization and aids in the integration of information stemming from external 
sources, where it acts as a reference for linking and translating information into a 
form suitable for the knowledge hub. The ontology has been designed specifically for 
the law enforcement domain and includes detailed provenance information and meta-
data related to information access restrictions. It is explicitly represented and can be 
 queried. All information within the ILE platform is represented in the ontology in 
order to facilitate entity linking and analysis. 
The ILE ontology is too large to reproduce it in full in this paper; it comprises 19 
high-level domain concepts which are further refined into a total of ~140 concepts 
and a taxonomy of ~400 specialized relationship types. It has been documented in [8]. 
The ontology conceptualizes the domain on three levels: meta-level where concept 
types are captured, the type level, where domain concepts are represented in terms of 
types, and the instance level, where instance-level data is represented and linked. For 
example, the meta-level defines EntityType, RelationshipType, and MetaAttribute-
Type. Their instances on the level below represent persons, organizations, (and more 
broadly a hierarchy of object types), concrete domain relationships that may be estab-
lished between objects (for example that a Person works for an Organization), and 
meta-data attributes related to access control, provenance, and temporal validity. 
These domain concepts are closely aligned with the draft National Police Infor-
mation Model (NPIM), complemented with relevant aspects drawn from the NIEM 
standard
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 and concepts related to case management. The provenance model is an ex-
tension of PROV-O [9]. The instances of the domain concepts form the objects com-
prising the Knowledge Graph on the lowest layer in the ontology. The aforementioned 
concepts are complemented with classes and objects representing data sources linked 
to the domain information stored therein as well as schema mapping information re-
quired to translate between the external source and the ontology model adopted within 
the federated architecture.  
This multi-level modelling method has been adopted to provide a modular and ex-
tensible knowledge representation architecture. The semantic technologies that under-
pin our platform facilitate incremental addition of elements to the ontology, and phas-
ing out of obsolete concepts can be implemented via meta-data annotations interpret-
ed by the underlying information systems. Changes in information representation 
received from external parties can be addressed by ontology matching techniques and 
machine learning methods for information extraction and linking. Profound changes 
in the information acquisition pipelines however would require changes to the under-
lying information system. Our modular architecture has been designed to accommo-
date such changes. 
Information from external sources is sought based on a catalog of data sources that 
are available to the system, each with a corresponding adapter that communicates 
with the external systems and rewrites the information and meta-data into the ontolo-
gy used within the ILE platform [11]. Our platform spans several sources, including 
an entity database (Person, Objects, Location, Event, and Relations), a case manage-
ment system, and a repository of unstructured documents.  
Information received from external systems is passed through an ingestion and en-
richment pipeline where entities are extracted [14], enriched with meta-data (prove-
nance and access restrictions) and linked to the knowledge graph in the linked data 
store.  
                                                          
2 https://www.niem.gov/ 
 Analytic services include entity extraction from unstructured text [14], entity link-
ing, similarity calculation and ranking. Services provided by commercial tools, such 
as network analysis and entity liking/resolution solutions, can be integrated in the 
modular architecture. 
Automation services will provide workflow orchestration and alert notices if new 
information relevant to a case becomes available. Workflow services will facilitate 
the enactment of work processes such as acquiring authorization and warrants. The 
automation services component is pending implementation. 
Cross-cutting technical concerns, including access control and user management, 
logging, monitoring and other deployment facilities, have been omitted in this archi-
tecture view. Our implementation builds on open source big data technologies (Ha-
doop/Spark, polyglot persistence, message queues, and RESTful interfaces). The 
technical building blocks are outlined in [8]. 
Fig. 1 draws the overall architecture and plot the direction of legal workflow pro-
cessing.  
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Architecture overview and legal workflow processing 
 4 Legal and governance issues 
A key concern is the incorporation of legal risk management and compliance con-
straints into the workflow execution to ensure observance of and compliance with the 
applicable legal rules, for example agency and privacy rules as well as internal agency 
policies and procedures. Natural Language parsing can be used to elicit event specifi-
cations that could then be translated to business rules in an executable formal lan-
guage and issued to an event processor in the knowledge hub [16]. These rules would 
be used to check and guarantee conformance of analytic processes/workflows and 
data usage. [16] provides support for extracting data from a variety of sources (rela-
tional databases, CSV files, JSON, and XML), for modeling it according to a vocabu-
lary of the user’s choice and for integrating multiple data sources. This process de-
serves a closer attention, because (i) it implies LEAs cooperation, and (ii) must be 
compliant with Australian law.
3
 
The D2D CRC’s law and policy team outlined for discussion a set of high level 
principles that may guide the development of an appropriate framework: (i) engender 
public confidence in government use of data and analytic tools, (ii) develop principles 
for data governance in National Security Law Enforcement (NSLE) agencies; (iii) 
employ clear and consistent principles in developing legal frameworks, (iv) improve 
processes to enhance effective use of data within NSLE agencies, (v) ensure the con-
tinued effectiveness of the oversight regime as technologies and NSLE agency prac-
tices evolve, (v) disentangle elements of technological change associated with ‘Big 
Data’, (vi) maintain data integrity and security in a high volume environment, (vii) 
ensure fair and appropriate use of data analytics, (viii) use appropriate systems for 
data matching, data integration or federated access that takes account of benefits and 
risks; (ix) ensure efficient, appropriate, and regulated sharing of specific data for 
NSLE purposes [17]. 
In a recent survey we carried out on the state of the art of Compliance by Design 
(CbD) [12], we found that the passage from Business to Legal CbD mainly follows a 
semantic path, in which Natural Language Processing (NLP), non-monotonic defeasi-
ble logic and inferential reasoning are combined with enriched annotated legal 
sources (e.g. described according linked data standards). This is aligned with recent 
developments in e-business
4
 [26] and e-government [27].  Architectures are deemed 
                                                          
3  We consider primarily investigations conducted by Australian law enforcement agencies, 
where compliance with Australian laws governing these investigations and subsequent legal 
proceedings is paramount. 
4 ISO/IEC 42010:2007 defines "architecture" as: "The fundamental organization of a system, 
embodied in its components, their relationships to each other and the environment, and the 
principles governing its design and evolution".  It has been fleshed out by [26], and [27] [28] 
for the e-government architecture. See esp. ADM Architecture Requirements Management, 
and the Architecture Compliance steps defined at TOGAF 9.1, Part VII: Architecture Capa-
bility Framework Architecture Compliance.  http://pubs.opengroup.org/architecture/togaf9-
doc/arch/  
 
 
 to be understandable, robust, complete, consistent and stable. [28] has proposed a 
comprehensive approach to develop interoperable European e-government services 
adapting and extending the existing enterprise architecture requirements. The investi-
gation shows that at least half —i.e. not all— of the 30 requirements identified are 
adequately addressed by enterprise architectures (EA).
5
 It concludes with ten interop-
erability challenges that should be taken into account and addressed when providing 
pan-European e-government services (PEGS) across Member State borders. Quoting 
at length:  (i)  critical success factors should be identified, (ii) an EA framework for 
PEGS should be built upon widely accepted principles and strategies, (iii) it should 
comprise architecture design principles and guidelines to reason about alternative 
design strategies, (iv) in order to facilitate stakeholder management, it should refer to 
abstract stakeholder classes and roles in interoperability projects and determine driv-
ers for their engagement, (v) the creation of contents can be improved through a 
methodology that supports the capturing of requirements from business-driven needs, 
policy implementation processes and other strategic aspects in order to establish 
common path and to increase the acceptance of architecture outputs among stakehold-
ers (vi) another methodology should describe how to define interoperability specifica-
tions on semantic and organizational level, which can be used as a basis for collabora-
tion agreements, (vii) a detailed design of each architecture should identify relevant 
model fragments and should be based on a commonly agreed architecture description 
language, (viii) there are missing guidelines and methods that describe how to transi-
tion and to govern architectures in multi-stakeholder environments, (ix) several inde-
pendent implementations of PEGS have to be coordinated, extended and sustained 
over time (e.g. it  should integrate appropriate assessment methodologies to measure 
specifications and the compliance of solutions with the underlying collaboration 
agreements, (x) other assessment methodologies can help to determine the level of 
business standardizations in a domain and to appraise the maturity of market solutions 
in order to detect appropriate ways forward.  
This is a valuable programme. Likewise, we have also devised one close to it with 
the Australian framework in mind. However, as [28] underline as well, business lan-
guages do not completely match all governance and security requirements. Interoper-
ability frameworks do not enable an anticipatory management [29]. 
Legal compliance is complex, even in relation to national laws where the jurisdic-
tion concerned is a unified, non-federal national state. There are several methodolo-
gies and languages to represent norms using formal rules —e.g. Regorous and Legal-
RuleML [31]—, but there are not fully automated ways to carry out such a task. Legal 
norms must be interpreted in particular fields according to the specific domains to 
which they apply, anticipating the possible risks and unintended side effects. In addi-
tion, ethical principles can nuance or mould this interpretation according to different 
jurisdictions — e.g. Fair Information Practices in USA, or Data Protection Principles 
                                                          
 
5 The 30 requirements obtained in the survey of the literature have been structured  into six 
categories [28]: project management (PM), stakeholder management (ST), service develop-
ment (SD), interoperability layers and architecture viewpoints (LV), building blocks (BB), 
and collaboration agreements (CA). 
 similar to the brand new General Data Protection Regulation in Europe. Similarly, 
information governance rules and policies differ between private corporations and 
state agencies. 
At a more general level, legal scholars have noticed that the protection of relative 
civil rights such as privacy does not necessarily entail tradeoffs [21]
6
. Nevertheless, as 
we have already suggested, there are many ways to comply with rule of law require-
ments, depending on the plurality of legal constraints and constitutional specifica-
tions. Apparently, protections for civil rights are not as clear —and  arguably as 
strong—  in Australia as in the EU, where the police and their criminal intelligence 
functions operate subject to well-developed data protection and privacy norms. In 
contrast to a more comprehensive, integrated EU approach, it could be argued that 
public transparency and operational secrecy are, for example, not as finely balanced 
under current Australian law [19]. Contrary to European provisions, the 2017 Austral-
ian Productivity Commission Inquiry Report on Data Availability and Use, excludes 
national security data [20]. As asserted by the Report, governments use data to moni-
tor and investigate compliance and implement enforcement actions. They retrieve, 
extract and analyse information from publicly available sources (Open Source Intelli-
gence, OSINT) in a way that can also be regulated [22].   
Having a closer look, problems about fragmentation and interoperability are analo-
gous in both Australia and Europe. Different as they might be, the post-facto investi-
gations about the Abdelsam brothers in the Bataclan crisis in Paris [30] and the in-
quest into the deaths arising from the Lindt Café siege in Sydney
7
 have come to simi-
lar conclusions. Cooperation among state departments and agencies; and between 
Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA), can and should be improved.  
These conclusions are not limited solely to security issues but can be also extended 
to the coordination of public administration and the legal system in policy domains. 
For instance, in many situations, problems might arise “because of gaps of infor-
mation flow between the family law system, the family violence system, and the child 
protection system: in many circumstances, important information is not being shared 
among courts and agencies and this is having a negative impact on victims, impeding 
the ‘seamlessness’ of the legal and service responses to the family violence”.8 
Disparity is produced as well across all Australian jurisdictions. At a federal level 
the Privacy Act 1988, for example, regulates the handling of personal information by 
the federal government and the private sector. The Act does not extend to state gov-
ernments. Some states have their own comprehensive frameworks. In Victoria, for 
example, the Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic) contains the following In-
formation Privacy Principles (IPPs) which apply to all information held by the Victo-
rian public sector (including the police and a contracted service provider): (i) Open 
and transparent management of personal information, (ii) Sensitive information, (iii) 
                                                          
6    International human rights law distinguishes between absolute and relative rights. Absolute 
rights —such as freedom from slavery, torture and servitude— cannot be suspended, restricted, 
or limited for any reason.  Non-absolute or relative rights are those which stand in the various 
private and legal relations, and can be discussed, re-defined or qualified.   
7 http://www.lindtinquest.justice.nsw.gov.au/ 
8  Australian Law Reform Commission (2010), as quoted in [20]. 
 Right to anonymity/pseudonymity, (iv) Notification of collection, (v) Purpose test for 
use / disclosure, (vi) Direct marketing restrictions, (vii) Cross border disclosure, (viii) 
Government-related or unique identifiers, (ix) Data quality, (x) Data security, (xi) 
Access and correction. South Australia, on the other hand, only has an administrative 
instruction requiring government agencies to comply with a set of Information Priva-
cy Principles while Western Australia does not currently have a comprehensive legis-
lative privacy regime.  
Australia has a comprehensive oversight regime in relation to national security and 
law enforcement agencies. Different bodies have however oversight over different 
agencies or have oversight over closely-defined aspects of a range of agencies. The 
fragmented nature of the oversight framework in Australia “will be challenged by an 
environment where NSLE agencies collaborate more closely in a Big Data frame-
work” [19]. But to reach this milestone, it is our contention that the information inte-
gration process that takes place on the platform through reusable ontologies and vo-
cabularies requires a broader regulatory framework. To overcome the patchwork of 
disparate and sometimes contradictory legal constraints, we will work within an in-
termediate implementation level, setting what can be called an “anchoring institution” 
between the semantic tools of the platform and LEAs (end-users). 
This set of intermediate conceptual rules constitute a semantic web regulatory 
model (SWRM), i.e. a specific cluster of guidelines to regulate the information flow, 
establishing a system of check and balances between LEA’s investigative powers and 
their use of semantic technology [22]. This is an indirect strategy for Compliance by 
Design (CbD) purposes, in which police officers might set forth internal and external 
controls, and adopt a conceptual scheme to implement privacy and security principles 
including ethics as a main component, i.e. at the intermediate level of linked democ-
racy [23]. To encompass both behavioural and informational trends, we use the ex-
pression ‘Compliance through Design’ [CtD] [12] . This means that the increasing of 
pressure on human compliance management resources in the security area can be 
taken into account [25]. The crucial point is the coexistence of both artificial and hu-
man decision-making and information processes. 
Likewise, ‘linked democracy’ can be defined as “a meso-level approach to both 
online and offline innovations that elucidates the interactions between people, tech-
nology, and data in particular settings, providing a framework of analysis to under-
stand the emerging properties (and tensions) of these interactions” [24]. Therefore, 
public principles such as transparency, accountability and security could be graduated 
and connected within particular investigations according to their weight at their spe-
cific implementation level. This entails the emergence of different notions, degrees 
and values of legal compliance, enhancing their semantic side, and outstripping the 
traditional obstacles of operating from separate information silos.    
It is worth noticing that from this pragmatic approach, interoperability does not on-
ly mean ‘semantic interoperability’ —the creation of a common meaning for infor-
mation ex- change across computational systems— but systemic interoperability. That 
is, the ability of complex systems to interact, share, and exchange information. It fo-
cuses onto the coordination of practices, including human behavior, organizational 
structures, tools, languages, and techniques [23]. Establishing such a model, translat-
 ing legal and systemic conditions to institutional and computational constraints and 
requirements, is the next step. 
Acknowledgements 
This research was partially funded by the Data to Decisions Cooperative Research 
Centre (D2D CRC), with participation of the Spanish Project DER2016-78108-P.  
Views expressed herein are however not necessarily representative of the views held 
by the funders. 
References 
1. Edwards, M., Rashid, A., Rayson, P. A systematic survey of online data mining technolo-
gy intended for law enforcement. ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR), 48 (1) (2015): 1-56. 
2. Scheepers, R., Whelan, C., Nielsen, I., Burcher, M.,  Integrated Law Enforcement Project, 
Qualitative End User Evaluation, Baseline Report. Technical Report, Data 2 Decisions 
CRC, 2017.   
3. Mayer, W., Stumptner, M., Grossmann, G., Jordan A. Semantic Interoperability in the Oil 
and Gas Industry: A Challenging Testbed for Semantic Technologies. In AAAI Fall Sym-
posium on Semantics for Big Data, Arlington, Virginia, November 2013. 
4. Law and Policy Program. Big Data Technology and National Security - Comparative In-
ternational Perspectives on Strategy, Policy and Law: Australia (Data to Decisions CRC), 
2016. 
5. Marks, A., Bowling, B. and Keenan, C.  Automatic Justice? Technology, Crime and Social 
Control. In: R. Brownsword, E. Scotford and K.Yeung (eds), The Oxford Handbook of the 
Law and Regulation of Technology, Oxford University Press, pp. 705-730, 2017. Availa-
ble at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2676154 [2015]  
6. Data to Decisions CRC Big Data Reference Architecture, vol. 1-4, Technical Report, Data 
to Decisions CRC, 2016. 
7. Heath, T., Bizer, C. Linked Data: Evolving the Web into a Global Data Space. Synthesis 
Lectures on the Semantic Web: Theory and Technology, Morgan & Claypool Publishers, 
2011. 
8. Grossmann, G., Kashefi, A.K., Feng, Z., Li, W., Kwashie, S., Liu, J., Mayer, W., 
Stumptner, M. Integrated Law Enforcement Platform Federated Data Model, Technical 
Report, Data 2 Decision CRC, 2017. 
9. Lebo, T., Sahoo, S., McGuinness, D., Belhajjame, K., Cheney, J., Corsar, D., Garijo, D., 
Soiland-Reyes, S., Zednik, S. and Zhao, J. Prov-o: The PROV ontology. W3C recommen-
dation, 2013. 
10. Stumptner, M., Mayer, W., Grossmann, G., Jiu, J., Li, W., De Koker, L., Mendelson, D., 
Bainbridge, B., Watts, D., Casanovas, P. An Architecture for Establishing Legal Semantic 
Workflows in the Context of Integrated Law Enforcement, Workshop on Legal Knowledge 
and the Semantic Web (LK&SW-2016), International Conference on Knowledge Engi-
neering and Knowledge Management, Bologna, Italy, Nov.  LNAI, 2017 (forthcoming).  
11. Bellahsene, Z., Bonifati, A., Rahm, E. Schema Matching and Mapping. Data-Centric Sys-
tems and Applications, Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 2011.  DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-
16518-4. 
12. Casanovas, P; González-Conejero, J. Technical Bases for Compliance by Design (CbD). 
CRC D2D Deliverable, May 2017 (updated July 2017). 
 13. Suchanek, F.M., Kasneci, G. and Weikum, G. YAGO: a core of semantic knowledge uni-
fying Wordnet and Wikipedia. In Proceedings of the 16th international conference on 
World Wide Web, pp. 697-706,   ACM, May 2007. 
14. Del Corro, L., Gemulla, R. Clausie: clause-based open information extraction. In Proceed-
ings of the 22nd international conference on World Wide Web, pp. 355-366, ACM, May 
2013.  
15. Cardellino, C., et al. Licentia: A Tool for Supporting Users in Data Licensing on the Web 
of Data. Proceedings of the 2014 International Conference on Posters & Demonstrations 
Track-Volume 1272. CEUR-WS. org, 2014. 
16. Gupta, S., Szekely, P., Knoblock, C.,  Aman, G., Taheriyan, M., Muslea, M. Karma: A 
system for mapping structured sources into the Semantic Web. In E. Simperl, P. Cimiano, 
A. Polleres, Ó. Corcho, and V. Presutti, editors, The Semantic Web: Research and Appli-
cations - 9th Extended Semantic Web Conference, ESWC 2012, Heraklion, Crete, Greece, 
May 27-31, 2012. Proceedings, LNCS 7295, pp. 430-434, Springer, 2012. 
17. Law and Policy Program. Big Data Technology and National Security - Comparative In-
ternational Perspectives on Strategy, Policy and Law: Australia (Data to Decisions CRC, 
2016). 
18. Casanovas, P., De Koker, L., Mendelson, and David Watts. "Regulation of Big Data: Per-
spectives on strategy, policy, law and privacy." Health and Technology (2017): 1-15. 
19. Bennet-Moses, L., de Koker, L. Open Secrets: Balancing Operational Secrecy and Trans-
parency in the Collection and Use of Data for National Security and Law Enforcement 
Agencies, CRC Report, 2017. 
20. Australian Government. Data availability and use. Productivity Commission Inquiry Re-
port, No. 82, 31 March 2017. 
21. Pagallo, U.  Online Security and the Protection of Civil Rights: A Legal Overview. Philos-
ophy & Technology 26 (2013):  381–395.  
22. Casanovas, P. Cyber Warfare and Organised Crime. A Regulatory Model and Meta-Model 
for Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). In R. Taddeo and L. Gkorioso, Ethics and Policies 
for Cyber Operations, pp. 139-167: Dordrecht: Springer International Publishing, 2017.  
23. Casanovas, P., Mendelson, D. & Poblet, M.  A Linked Democracy approach to regulate 
health data. Health and Technology (2017), DOI: 10.1007/s12553-017-0191-5 
24. Poblet, M. and Plaza, E. Democracy Models and Civic Technologies: Tensions, Trilem-
mas, and Trade-offs, 2017, arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.09015. 
25. Watts, D., Bridget Bainbridge, B., de Koker, L., Casanovas, P.,  Smythe,  S. Project B.3 A 
Governance Framework for the National Criminal  Intelligence System (NCIS),  Data to 
Decisions Cooperative Research Centre, La Trobe University, 30 June 2017. 
26. Open Group Standard TOGAF Version 9.1 Document Number: G116. ISBN: 
9789087536794. 
27. Brous, P., Janssen, M., Vilminko-Heikkinen, R. Coordinating Decision-Making in Data 
Management Activities: A Systematic Review of Data Governance Principles. In H. J. 
Scholl et al. International Conference on Electronic Government and the Information Sys-
tems Perspective EGOVIS 2016, LNCS 9820, pp. 115-125, Springer International Publish-
ing, 2016. 
28. Mondorf, A., Wimmer, M.A. Requirements for an Architecture Framework for Pan-
European E-Government Services. In H. J. Scholl et al. International Conference on Elec-
tronic Government and the Information Systems Perspective EGOVIS 2016, LNCS 9820, 
pp. 135-150, Springer International Publishing, 2016. 
 29. Mondorf, A. and Wimmer, M., Contextual Components of an Enterprise Architecture 
Framework for Pan-European eGovernment Services. In Proceedings of the 50th Hawaii 
International Conference on System Sciences, HICSS, 2017, pp. 2933-2942. 
30. Bureš, O., 2016. Intelligence sharing and the fight against terrorism in the EU: lessons 
learned from Europol. European View, 15(1): 57-66. 
31. Sadiq, S., Governatori. G. A methodological framework for aligning business processes 
and regulatory compliance. In: Jan van Brocke and Michael Rosemann, editors, Handbook 
of Business Process Management, pp. 159-176, Springer, 2010. 
 
